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"shall not exceed the amount for which the claim could have been settled."26
Conclusion
Professional liability insurance for attorneys offers not only financial
security, but also a method for expedient and efficacious settlement of just
claims without needless notoriety. The policies do not appear to contra-
vene any ethical standards or the canon of ethics of the American Bar
Association.27 The fact that such policies are now offered by a number
of insurance companies is highly indicative of an anticipated market.
loseph Moless*
26 Lloyd's of London ("Ham Pool") Attorney's Indemnity.
27 Dautch, Lawyers' Indemnity Insurance, 46 CoM. L.J. 412, 413 (1941).
* Member, Second Year Class.
ARCHITECTS LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS FOR NEGLIGENCE
IN THE PREPARATION OF PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS
Is an architect liable to third persons injured as a result of his negligence
in the preparation of plans and specifications? In California the answer
appears to be yes.
In the past the architect has been sheltered from liability to third persons
for his negligence by either (1) shifting responsibility to the owner after
completion and acceptance of the structure,, or (2) limiting his duty of
care to those who were parties to the contract2-the privity of contract doc-
trine. These technical limitations on liability apparently resulted from con-
cern over the large number of persons endangered by a defective structure
and the extensive period of liability (the life of the structure). 3
Boswell v. Laird,4 an early California decision, considered the liability
of architects, who had contracted to design and build a dam, for property
damage to a third party during the course of construction. The court said
that the contractore was liable for injuries to third parties before comple-
tion and acceptance,6 but "by acceptance and subsequent use, the owners
assume to the world the responsibility of its sufficiency, and to third parties,
the liability of the contractors has ceased, and their own commenced."7
1 See, e.g., Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 68 Am. Dec. 345 (1857).
2 See, e.g., Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
3 See Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV.
711, 713 (1959).
4 8 Cal. 469, 68 Am. Dec. 345 (1857).
5 The court referred to the defendants as contractors, although they performed as
both architects and contractors.
That contractors and architects are liable to third persons during the course of
construction, see Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d
185 (1962) (contractor liable); Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259
P.2d 934 (1953) (approving architect's liability in principle); PossER, TORTS 517 (2d
ed. 1955).
78 Cal. at 498, 68 Am. Dec. at 358. Accord, Fanjoy v. Seales, 29 Cal. 243 (1865);
Kolburn v. P. J. Walker Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 545, 101 P.2d 747 (1940).
NOTES
The court further stated that the owners, before acceptance, must subject
the work to proper tests to see that it is sufficient as to all particulars nec-
essary for the safety of third persons." The reasoning of the court was
essentially a proximate cause analysis in that the intervening act of the
owner in accepting the defect and maintaining the dangerous condition
broke the causal connection between the negligent contractor and the in-
jured third person, shifting the responsibility to the owner.9 Later Cali-
fornia decisions retained the general rule of nonliability after acceptance
by the owner, but incorporated it into the privity of contract doctrine. 0
The privity doctrine was first pronounced by the Court of Exchequer
in Winterbottom v. Wright,": in which a mail coach driver alleged that his
injuries were caused by a third party's breach of contract to keep the coach
in repair. The court said that since the defendant's duty to act arose under
a contract, he was under no duty to those not parties to the contract. The
court foresaw outrageous and limitless consequences unless the duties of
the contracting parties were thus limited. It is difficult to see why the
mere existence of a contract should interfere with a tort duty, but the idea
was accepted and expanded into a general tort rule, enabling the courts
to strictly limit liability.
The privity rule became subject to certain exceptions as to suppliers
of chattels, where the article was "imminently" or "inherently" dangerous. 2
Then Judge Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 3 held that the
privity rule did not apply where the nature of the product was such that
it was reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made. MacPherson caused the exception to swallow the asserted general
rule of nonliability, 4 and now no negligent manufacturer can shield him-
self behind the privity doctrine.'- The privity doctrine was carried over
into the area of building construction, and still survives, but the trend
seems to be towards the repudiation of the doctrine in this field as well. 6
The California courts recognized the privity doctrine, but applied to
building construction the same exceptions that had been applied to sup-
pliers of chattels. In Johnston v. Long,7 the court, in overruling the de-
fendant contractor's demurrer, said a building contractor was liable "if the
8 8 Cal. at 498, 68 Am. Dec. at 358.
9 Accord, Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 642, 111 Pac. 899, 906 (1910).
10 See, e.g., Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932)
(elevator repair contract).
"110 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
"2PRossER, TORTS 499 (2d ed. 1955).
13217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14 PossEn, TORTS 500 (2d ed. 1955).
'5 Moimus, ToRTs 154 (1953). See generally id. at 153-56; PossEa, TORTS §§ 84-85
(2d ed. 1955).
16 See MoRius, TORTS 155-56 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (2d ed. 1955); 5 AM.
JuR. 2d Architects § 25 (1962). RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 385 (1934), states that a person
who erects a structure on land is liable for bodily harm to third persons after acceptance
by the owner under the same rules that determine the liability of a manufacturer of
chattels.
17 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).
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work done and turned over by him is so negligently defective as to be
imminently dangerous to third persons."18 The court reversed a nonsuit in
Hale v. Depaoli,19 again involving a building contractor, and, applying the
MacPherson rule, further extended the exception to all things "reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made."20 In Dow v.
Holly Mfg. Co.,21 a building contractor (who had also prepared the plans
and specifications for the house) was held liable for a death caused by
the installation of a defective gas heater. The court relied on the Mac-
Pherson rule, and noted that it had become a substitute for the general
rule of nonliability, rather than an exception.22 In Biakania v. Irving,23 the
court affirmed a judgment for the beneficiary under a will (which had
failed for lack of attesting signatures) against the notaiy public who had
negligently drawn the will. The court said that the requirement of privity
had been greatly liberalized and that the determination of liability "is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors."24
Then in Montijo v. Swift2 the plaintiff was injured when she fell on a
stairway in a bus depot. Evidence at the trial indicated that the stair rail
did not extend to the last step, and that the tile construction created an
optical illusion as to where the steps ended. The architect who had designed
and supervised construction of the stairway was made a defendant. In
reversing judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict for the
plaintiff, and affirming the order granting a new trial, 28 the court said "an
architect who plans and supervises construction work as an independent
contractor, is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the course thereof
for the protection of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable cer-
tainty may be injured by his failure to do so, even though such injury
may occur after his work has been accepted by the person engaging his
services."27
18 Id. at 837, 133 P.2d at 410.
19 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183 (1948).
20 Id. at 232, 201 P.2d at 13, 13 A.L.R.2d at 188. Accord, Johnson v. City of San
Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794, 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1960) (paving contractor); Hogan v.
Miller, 153 Cal. App. 2d 107, 314 P.2d 230 (1957) (building contractor); Freeman v.
Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P.2d 510 (1957) (building contractor); Schifano v.
Security Bldg. Co., 133 Cal. App. 2d 70, 283 P.2d 306 (1955) (building contractor).
2149 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
22 Id. at 727, 321 P.2d at 740.
23 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
24 Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. Among these factors are "the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm." Ibid. See Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962) (beneficiaries under a will). The court approved Biakania but found that
the attorney who had drawn the will had not been negligent.
25 219 A.C.A. 416, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
26 The trial court had held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the injury
had been caused by the defect.
27 Id. at 418, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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The Montijo case is significant in that it rejects not only the privity doc-
trine, by affirmatively placing the architect under a duty of care to fore-
seeable plaintiffs, but also the theory of shifting responsibility after com-
pletion and acceptance by the owner. But there are additional factors
which Montijo did not specifically consider.
The Montijo case involved an architect who had both planned and
supervised the construction work. Does this rule also apply to the architect
who merely prepares the plans and specifications? In Paxton v. Alameda
County,2 8 a workman was injured when he fell through roof sheathing.
It was alleged that the architect was negligent in the preparation of the
plans and specifications in that the spacing of the rafters was not in accord
with the usual practice. The court held that the architect had not been
negligent, but approved liability if he had been. Although the case involved
liability during the course of construction, there is no reason to assume
that acceptance by the owner would terminate the liability of the planning
architect any more than it would the liability of the supervising architect.29
The implication of Paxton and Montijo, taken together, is that an architect
who prepares plans and specifications is under a duty of care to foresee-
able plaintiffs, which survives completion and acceptance by the owner.
Montijo did not consider to what extent the intervening acts of the
contractor, in building in the defect, and the owner, in accepting and
maintaining the defect, would affect the architect's liability. Johnston v.
Long 0 stated that a building contractor was not liable if the owner knew of
the defect or could discover it by reasonable inspection.31 It is doubtful
that the Johnston case would apply today to the question of an architect's
liability.32 Where the injury-causing defect is not known to the contractor
or the owner, there is no basis to consider their acts as superseding causes
of the injury. An act merely negligent is not a superseding cause. To break
the chain of causation the intervening act must be extraordinarily negli-
gent.33 If the contractor or owner knew of the defect, and had full realiza-
28 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953).
29 That defects in plans and specifications can be considered the cause of injury
after completion and acceptance, see Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215
A.C.A. 72, 29 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1963). A third person, injured after completion and
acceptance of a grandstand, brought an action against the owner and the building con-
tractor. The owner had furnished the plans. The court held that the injury-causing
defect was the proximate result of fault in the plans and specifications and not negligence
on the part of the contractor.
30 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943), supra note 17.
31 This rule in Johnston was stated in the context of an exception to the privity
doctrine. A building contractor was said to be liable if the defect was imminently dan-
gerous, provided "the owner does not know of the dangerous condition or defect and
would not discover it by reasonable inspection." Id. at 837, 133 P.2d at 410.
32 Johnston was treated only as a part of the historical development of the privity
doctrine in a case involving the negligence of a subcontractor in the building of a
swimming pool, where the obvious defect issue was not involved. Stewart v. Cox, 55
Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961).
33 [T]he fact that an intervening act of a third person is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding cause if a reasonable man knowing the
situation existing when the act of the third person is done would not regard it
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tion of the danger, their acts would apparently be considered extraordinarily
negligent, and responsibility would be shifted from the architect. 34 The
concepts of proximate cause, superseding cause and shifting responsibility
are founded on considerations of policy. 5 As a matter of policy it is diffi-
cult to see why the intervening negligence of the contractor or owner
should shield the architect. The preparation of plans and specifications is
an affirmative act and begins the chain of causation. The original negli-
gence of the architect continues to the time of the injury, and contributes
substantially to it in conjunction with the acts of the contractor or owner.
Each of the acts (by the architect, the contractor and the owner) is a con-
curring cause, and full liability should attach to each.3 6
If acceptance of the structure by the owner does not cut off an archi-
tect's liability for negligence, it follows a fortiori that approval of the plans
by the owner should not cut off this liability where the archtect's negligence
is a concurring cause of the injury. 3 7
Conclusion
Certain objections may be raised to holding the architect liable for his
negligence. One common criticism is that after the owner has accepted
the structure, the architect has no control over its maintenance. This is of
course quite true, but it is irrelevant. The liability is based on negligence
in the preparation of plans and specifications (or in supervision) and does
not extend to after-developing dangers.
That a structure may endanger a great many possible plaintiffs is also
true, but this would seem to be all the more reason to hold architects
as highly extraordinary that the third person so acted or the act is a normal
response to a situation created by the defendant's conduct and the manner in
which the intervening act is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
Id. at 864, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 525, 362 P.2d at 349 (subcontractor liable to owner despite
intervening acts of general contractor). Accord, RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 447 (1934).
That the rules from RESTATEMNT, TorTs §§ 442-52 regarding proximate causation have
been adopted in California, see, e.g., McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295,
298-99, 195 P.2d 783, 786 (1948); Stasulat v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 631,
637, 67 P.2d 678, 681 (1937).
34 "[N]egligent conduct with full realization of the danger may properly be con-
sidered highly extraordinary." Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 865, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521,
525, 362 P.2d 345, 349 (1961).
35 See Paossim, TORTS §§ 47-49 (2d ed. 1955).
36 Cf. Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App. 2d 44, 62, 273 P.2d 306, 317 (1954). In a
cross-action by the owner against the architects for negligence, the court said that the
concurrent negligence of the contractor (who was not joined) would not relieve the
architects of their own negligence.
37 But see Sherman v. Miller Constr. Co., 90 Ind. App. 462, 158 N.E. 255 (1927),
which held that an architect was not liable because the plans had been approved by a
school trustee. Since the trustee had acted in his official capacity, he was not liable
under local law, and therefore, the court said, the architect could not be held liable.
The conclusion is questionable since public officials generally have no experience in the
technicalities of planning and constructing buildings. The very existence of such tech-
nicalities is the architect's raison d'etre. Even if the public official is skilled in these
technicalities the responsibility of the architect to third persons should not be discharged
where the architect's negligence is a concurring cause.
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